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RECENT West Irian (West New Guinea) case furnished
the first occasion on which the United Nations actually took over
the administration of a territory other than its own headquarters
properties. However, there are earlier precedents in connection
with Trieste and Palestine in which the organization decided to
undertake functions of this character without, in the end, actually
doing so. The present study undertakes, on the basis of these cases,
to consider not only the substantive Charter law pertaining to this
type of United Nations activity, but also and perhaps more importantly, the bearing of these cases on the development of the Charter
as an effective instrument for the maintenance of peace and security.
The latter issue naturally arises because of the apparent absence of
any Charter provision specifically authorizing territorial administration by the United Nations.
The earliest case originated with the Permanent Statute of the
Free Territory of Trieste, which was annexed to the 1947 Italian
Peace Treaty' and which provided in article 2:
The integrity and independence of the Free Territory shall be assured
by the Security Council of the United Nations Organization. This
responsibility implies that the Council shall:
(a) ensure the observance of the present Statute and in particular
the protection of the basic human rights of the inhabitants.
(b) ensure the maintenance of public order and security in the Free
Territory.
There were other clauses which provided that the governor would
be appointed and subject to suspension by the Council,2 and.-that
HE

* This article is based on material contained in a study in progress concerning the
use of the United Nations for the advancement of the rule of law in international
relations.
t World Rule of Law Center, Duke University.
I Annex VI, Treaty of Peace with Italy, Feb. 10, 1947, 61 Stat. 1245, 1430, 49
U.N.T.S. 3, 187; 42 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 47, 97 (1948).
2
Annex VI, Treaty of Peace with Italy, Feb. 10, 1947, art. 11, 61 Stat. 1245, 1432,
49 U.N.T.S. 189.
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representative.3

he would have the status of the Council's
The governor was given a power of veto over acts of the popular assembly;
however if, following a veto, the popular assembly insisted upon
passing a piece of legislation and the governor refused to agree, the
4
final decision would rest with the Security Council.
When the Council took up the request that it assume these
powers, several members queried its authority under the Charter to
do so. It was generally recognized, in the ensuing debate, 5 that there
was no specific provision in the Charter enabling the Council to
assume such responsibilities. However a consensus emerged holding
that the necessary authority could be found in article 24, the relevant
parts of which are as follows:
1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility
for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that
in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council
acts on their behalf.
2. In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The
specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these
duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII.
In reaching its decision6 on this basis, the Council recognized that
the authority for the desired action was not to be found in any of the
chapters of the Charter enumerated in paragraph 2 of this article.
On this point, a memorandum presented by the Secretariat 7 declared
that it was understood at San Francisco that the Security Council
would not be restricted to the specific powers set forth in these chap8
ters.
8 Annex VI, Treaty of Peace with Italy, Feb. 10, 1947, art. 17, 61 Stat. 1245, 1433,
49 U.N.T.S. 3, 190.
'Annex VI, Treaty of Peace with Italy, Feb. 10, 1947, art. 19, 61 Stat. 1245, 1434,
49 U.N.T.S. 3, 191.
5 U.N. SECUmTY COUNCIL OFF. REc. 2d year, 89th, 91st meetings (1947).
6'd., 91st meeting 60-61. The powers were never actually assumed because of
inability to reach agreement in the Security Council on the details of the administra.
tion.

7Id. at 44-45.
8 The reference is to the 14th meeting of Committee III/1 (Doc. No. 597, III/l/30,
11 U.N. CONF. INT'L ORG. Docs. 393 (1945)) which, according to the Secretariat memo
randum, revealed the intent of the framers that when the maintenance of peace and
security is in issue, the Council should not be regarded as limited by specific Chartei
provisions, other than the fundamental principles and purposes found in chapter 1.
See GOODRICH & HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND Docu.
MENTS 205

(2d ed. rev. 1949); Schachter, The Development of International Law
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Although the members of the Council generally found article 24
broad enough to embrace the power desired to be assumed in the
case of Trieste, the debate in the Council evidenced a lively awareness that the action under consideration would constitute a development of the Charter through assertion of a power not specified
therein. The importance of public opinion in this connection was
also recognized by the French representative when he said that:
[W]orld opinion would certainly not understand it, if the Security
Council were to give the impression of evading a responsibility so closely
related to the maintenance of international peace and security, as it is
precisely the main task and responsibility of the Security Council. 9
The United Kingdom representative said that while it was right
to suggest the absence of Charter authority, the Council should
think carefully before creating a precedent which would debar it, in
the future, from accepting any responsibilities not specifically enumerated in the Charter. He thought that, in the future, "very difficult questions may often arise, in which it really will be necessary to
turn to the Council for assistance." He suggested that article 24 was
broad enough to justify the Council in assuming the responsibilities
for Trieste specified in the Italian Peace Treaty.'0
The United States representative stressed that, in drafting this
treaty, the only possible solution for the Trieste problem was internationalization. It was necessary that such an international regime
be guaranteed, and it was far more in the spirit of the times that the
United Nations should do this than it should be done by the principal powers which had engaged in the war or by an individual state.
He went on:
Through the Legal Opinions of the United Nations Secretariat, 25 BRIT. YB. INTL L.
91, 97-98 (1948). Kelsen, with whom the present writer agees, maintains that the
discussion in question does not justify this conclusion: "This discussion at the San
Francisco Conference shows that some delegates were of the opinion that the Security
Council was not restricted to the specific powers set forth in Chapters VI, VII and
VIII (Chapter XII was not yet inserted into the text of the Charter). But it does
not show a generally accepted opinion that the powers conferred upon the Council
by article 24 are limited only by being 'subject to the purposes and principles of the
United Nations,' as the Secretary-General maintained in his statement." KEasN, Tis
LAwv or TmE UNITED NATIONS 284 n.6, 285 (1950).
Further evidence in support of this view is believed to be found in the record of the
25th meeting of the Coordination Committee of the Conference. 17 U.N. CONF. INTr'L
ORG. Docs. 169, 171-72 (WD 422, CO/186) (1945).
0 U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REC. 2d year, 89th meeting 16 (1947).
'Old. at 9-10.
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The Security Council should not, in my view, be afraid of leaping to
t ke such a responsibility. It is in the fulfillment of such a responsibility
that the United Nations justifies its existence. 1
The Colombian representative said that his country was favorable to enlarging the powers of the Security Council and of the
Assembly. He considered it desirable to establish the precedent
that the Council should be able to act on the basis of the spirit of
the Charter, rather than on a definite provision.12
In the light 6f subsequent developments it no longer seems possible to regard article'24 as furnishing the necessary Charter authority
for the administration of territory by the United Nations.
As a first reason for this view, it is to be observed that for the
fulfillment of the broad responsibility conferred upon the Security
'Council by this article, the Charter elsewhere specifies that the Council is to have certain more specific powers, notably those pertaining
to "collective measures," "provisional measures," and the "peaceful
settlement" function. The function assumed in the Trieste case
appears to be essentially different from a collective' or provisional
measure, and while it might be said to have had the broad purpose
of "peaceful settlement" of a dispute between Italy and Yugoslavia,
it is also essentially different from the "peaceful settlement" function
of the Security Council, which is defined in chapter VI of the Charter. While the Council undoubtedly has the authority to assist in
the settlement of disputes by the performance of such related functions as investigations and the appointment of subsidiary organs, its
basic ,power vis-A-vis the parties to disputes and situations is the
power of recommendation. The assumption of governmental responsibility, as in the Trieste case, appears to have an essentially
different constitutional character.
The motivation for assuming such a function may also be essentially different from that of maintaining peace and security. This
is illustrated by the Jerusalem case, which will be discussed more
fully below. The United Nations decision to assume responsibility
for Jerusalem as an international city was motivated in part, no
doubt, by considerations relating to the maintenance of peace and
security, but also, certainly, in part to assure the protection of, and
free access to, holy places of three religions.
"Id. at 11.
22 Id. at 18.
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The final reason for considering that article 24 is not the true
basis of Charter authority for such measures is found in the fact
that, even if it were otherwise applicable, it applies only to the
Security Council, whereas, since the Trieste case, it has always been
the General Assembly which has decided to assume the ultimate responsibility for the United Nations in such matters.
In the absence of any reasonably specific authority for such action
in the Charter, and of any apparent intent on the part of the framers
to include such authority, it is believed to be the best solution of the
resulting problem to regard the Council action in the Trieste case
as the first step in a potential process of Charter modification. We
are not here, of course, referring to formal Charter amendment, but
rather to Charter modification through practice and acquiescence
of the members. If this were to be regarded as the true character
of the Trieste case, it would not be the only instance of the kind
in the history of the organization. The best known case in which
such a modification was actually carried out pertains to a Security
Council voting rule. Article 27 (3) stipulates that decisions on nonprocedural matters shall require "an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members."
Through practice generally acquiesced in, however, it has become
well established that the abstention of a permanent member will not
13
defeat a decision of this kind.
From the point of view of constitutional development, the basic
elements of the Council's action in the Trieste case may be said to
have consisted in an awareness of the need for the type of activity
in question, and the disposition to take steps to establish the neces12 Professor Gross traced this development up to mid-1950, at which time he could
say that the modified rule had not become effective with respect to the Security
Council's use of force. Gross, Voting in the Security Council: Abstention From Voting
and Absence From Meetings, 60 YALE L.J. 209, 227-28 (1951). Subsequently, however,
the Council adopted the resolution of February 21, 1961, urging the U.N. Force in
the Congo to use force "if necessary" and "in the last resort" to prevent civil war in
the Congo, and this was universally regarded as a valid decision, notwithstanding
the abstention of the Soviet and French representatives. In a recent statement, Professor Gross recognizes the modified rule as now being effective in all cases: "In the
absence of effective procedure for authoritative interpretation, differences are bound
to arise and remain unresolved unless a general consensus emerges as it did, for instance, in connection with the abstention of permanent members of the Security
Council contrary to the letter of article 27, paragraph 2." Gross, Expenses of the
United Nations for Peace-Keeping Operations: The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice, 17 INT. ORG. 1, 10 (1963).
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sary Charter basis, notwithstanding the lack of a specific authorization in the Charter as written. In this sense it may be said that the
Council took the essential first step in a process of Charter development. In view of this basically satisfactory handling of a constitutional question of this kind, it is all the more surprising that when
similar situations arose, raising corresponding questions as to the
powers of the General Assembly, no similar elucidation of Charter
issues took place.
The problem arose in several forms, in the same year as the
Trieste debate, in connection with the Assembly's Plan of Partition
with Economic Union of Palestine. There the Assembly undertook
to provide a plan for the future government of Palestine, in view of
the impending termination of the Palestine Mandate conferred upon
the United Kingdom by the League of Nations. The Plan of Partition with Economic Union1 4 provided for the division of Palestine
into an Arab and a Jewish state; Jerusalem was to be an international city.
To facilitate the transfer of government from the Mandatory
Power to this new regime, the plan called for the establishment of
a United Nations Palestine Commission, which was to take over the
administration of Palestine as the Mandate came to an end. The
Commission was then to establish provisional councils of government for the new Arab and Jewish states, which were to act under
the Commission's direction until full responsibility should, in due
course, be turned over to them.1 5
Arab delegations challenged the legal authority of the United
Nations to assume such powers."' Undertaking to answer this question, the Polish delegate, Pruszynski, chairman of the subcommittee
which drafted the plan, pointed out that:
Since the United Kingdom had stated that it was prepared to transfer
Nations, the United Nations
its powers only to an organ of the United
7
was obliged to establish such an organ.1
He went on to say:
2' Res. 181 (II), U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. Rac. 2d Sess., Resolutions 131, 132 (1947). This
resolution recommended that the parties carry out the plan which was annexed to it.
However the plan was rejected by the Arabs and never entered into force.
15
Id. at 133.
'Old., Ad Hoc Comm. on the Palestinian Question 150 (1947).
27 Id. at 160.
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The Commission ... was not to act as the government of Palestine but
solely as the body through whose agency the administration of the country would be transferred to the provisional councils of government .... 18
The United States representative argued along a similar line in the
plenary session. He emphasized the Assembly's power to recommend and also pointed to its power under article 22 to set up subsidiary organs. 19 He then went on to say:
In view of the nature of these administrative functions, I do not believe
that we can seriously question this temporary and transitory assistance
which would be extended to the non-self-governing peoples of territories
which will become two States, in their efforts to establish themselves as
20
free and independent members of the family of nations.
To say that an action cannot be questioned does not serve as an
answer when the action is, in fact, questioned. There is here, nevertheless, an argument to the effect that if the parties to a dispute
accept a recommendation of the Assembly, then the Assembly may
take reasonable action to assist the parties in carrying out the recommendation. This would involve the extension of an existing
authority by which, for example, if the Assembly should recommend
a conciliation procedure to the parties to a dispute, and they accept,
it would undoubtedly be in order for the Assembly to appoint a
conciliation commission to assist them in carrying out the agreed
procedure. Conciliation is undoubtedly within the "peaceful settlement" function possessed by the Assembly. However, undertaking
the responsibility for governing a territory, as a means of assisting
the parties to carry out an agreement, may be in a somewhat different
category.
In any event, however, it is clear that, in order that this theory of
interpretation should be applicable, the transition from one authority to another would have to be peaceful and swift. The United
States representative in the Assembly's plenary meeting, when he
advanced this argument, evidently thought that such would be the
case. To the contrary, however, violence increased as the Arab population showed itself determined to prevent the implementation of
the plan following its adoption by the Assembly.
The plan also provided a supervisory role for the Security Coun
cil with respect to the Commission:
18Ibid.
'9 Id., Plenary 1326.

20Id. at 1327.
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The Commission shall be guided in its activities by the recommendations of the General Assembly and by such instructions as the Council
may consider necessary to issue. 21
In endeavoring to explain the legal basis of the Security Council
function under this provision, Mr. Pruszynsky said that it was based
on a paragraph in the draft resolution under debate "which provided that the General Assembly should request the Security Council to take the necessary measures for the implementation of the
plan; it was also based on Article 10 of the Charter."2 2 Since, however, the question at issue concerned the powers of the Security
Council under the Charter, it could hardly be considered to be satisfactorily answered either by reference to a General Assembly resolution 28 or to a Charter provision which is applicable only to the
Assembly.
Another unsatisfactory mode of dealing with constitutional problems of this kind-that of ignoring them-is illustrated by the Assembly's treatment of Arab challenges to the validity of two other aspects
of the Plan of Partition with Economic Union of Palestine. These
were the plans for the internationalization of Jerusalem and for the
appointment of the "neutral" members of the proposed Joint Economic Board.
The plan provided that Jerusalem should be established as a
corpus separatum under a special international regime to be administered by the United Nations. The Trusteeship Council was designated to discharge the responsibilities of the United Nations in this
respect.
The role of the United Nations with respect to the Joint Economic Board to be established pursuant to the plan consisted in the
appointment of three members by the Economic and Social Council.
These would hold the balance between an equal number of members representing, respectively, the new Arab and Jewish states and
would, of course, have the deciding vote on issues as to which the
two states were in disagreement. The Board was to implement the
measures necessary to realize the objectives of the economic union,
and it was to possess the necessary powers of organization and administration for this purpose. The objection was made at the time
21 1d, Resolutions 135-36.
22Id., Ad Hoc Comm. on the Palestinian Question 161 (1947).

"See Schachter, supra note 8, at 100-01.
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that "the net effect of this proposal is... to authorize the United Nations to take a direct part in the administration of the economic life
of the country." 24 Despite Arab protests that the United Nations
was without Charter authority to undertake the responsibilities envisioned for it with respect to Jerusalem and the Joint Economic
Board,25 the Assembly proceeded to adopt the Plan of Partition with
Economic Union without attempting to answer the questions thus
raised.
The West Irian (West New Guinea) case represents the latest
instance in which the United Nations accepted full or partial responsibility for the governing of a territory. Here the United Nations went further than in the previous cases; it actually took over
the administration of the territory in question. The arrangement
was entered into by the Netherlands and Indonesian governments
with the assistance of the Secretary-General, subject to the approval of
the General Assembly, which was duly given. Article V of the agreement provides:
The United Nations Administrator, as chief executive officer of the
UNTEA [United Nations Temporary Executive Authority], will have
full authority under the direction of the Secretary-General to administer
the territory for the period of the UNTEA
administration in accordance
26
with the terms of the present agreement.
In the Assembly debate on the agreement, the Secretary-General
indicated his view of the nature of the Charter authority under
which the United Nations was acting:
This novel settlement may well be a step in the gradual evolution of
the United Nations as an increasingly effective instrument for carrying
out policies agreed upon between member governments 27for the peaceful
resolution of their differences, in line with the Charter.
This recalls an argument advanced in support of the validity under
the Charter of the role contemplated for the United Nations Palestine Commission. The United Nations role in West Irian was quite
similar to the intended role of the Palestine Commission; in both
2, U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. Ec. 2d Sess., Ad Hoc Comm. on the Palestinian Question
279 (A/AC. 14/32 and Add. 1) (1947).
25 Ibid. See also the remarks of Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan, id., Plenary 1370-73.
209 U.N. REv. No. 9, at 39, 40 (Sept. 1962).
On May 1, 1963 the administration of the territory was transferred by the UNTEA to Indonesia. Under the agreement, however, the U.N. retains a role in connection with an act of self-determination by the people of West Irian to be carried out before the end of 1969.
21d.,

No. 10, at 8 (Oct. 1962).
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cases the function was to effectuate a transition of governmental
power from one authority to another. In the earlier case the theory
advanced by Mr. Pruszynski, 2s and implied in the statement of the
United States representative in the plenary session, 2 was that the
United Nations was not to assume a governmental function, but was
merely to act as the agency by which the powers of government
would be transferred. It is submitted that this theory involves a
fiction, since it seems indisputable that the United Nations Palestine
Commission would have had to assume some degree of governmental
authority.
Does the above-quoted statement of the Secretary-General in the
West Irian case mean to advance the same fiction that the United
Nations would not be assuming powers of government in that territory? This is hardly to be assumed, considering the fact that the
elaborate process provided in the treaty was designed for the purpose
of enabling the United Nations to assume administrative authority
over the territory, and that the Secretary-General himself negotiated
the agreement and was to be responsible for the United Nations administration of the territory.
Does the Secretary-General's statement then mean that, since the
United Nations action was "in line with the Charter," the Charter
provides the authority by which the organization can take over
governmental responsibility for a territory? This would seem to be
the most logical meaning to attach to it. However, the presentation
of it is here too vague to be productive in terms of the evolution of
a workable constitutional system, which includes the necessary development of public opinion.
The approach followed in the Trieste case was sounder, it is
submitted, because it was therein made perfectly clear that the
Charter was being developed by recognizing in the United Nations
the precise and basically important function of taking over governmental responsibility for a territory. As indicated above, the theory
there was that an international regime for the territory in question
had become necessary; that the United Nations was, by all odds, the
most appropriate agency for assuming the supervision of such a
regime; and that this role could be justified under the authority of
article 24, which recognizes the Security Council as having primary
28 See text accompanying note 18 supra.
2P See text accompanying note 20 supra.
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responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security. It may
have been felt that this theory was difficult to apply in the various
aspects of the Palestine and West Irian cases since article 24 refers
to the Security Council and in these cases the responsibility was to
be exercised by other United Nations organs. However, for the
following reasons, this difficulty would not seem insurmountable:
1. When the Security Council acts, it acts for the United Nations as a whole. Furthermore, as is specified in article 24 itself, the
Council's responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security is
"primary" only and not exclusive. The Assembly acted upon this
theory in 1950 when, in adopting the "Uniting for Peace" resolution, 30 it asserted a residual power to act in cases where the Council
is paralyzed by the veto.
2. As indicated above in discussing the Trieste case, the assumption of responsibility for the government of a territory by the United
Nations really involves the modification of the Charter by recognizing in the organization a power not therein spelled out and not
contemplated by the framers. If, in some cases, it appears as reasonable and appropriate that the Security Council should exercise this
power, then it would seem equally proper for the Assembly to exercise it in situations in which it seems more appropriate for that body
to act.81
If the authority of the United Nations to administer territory
involves, in effect, a modification of the Charter, this is not to suggest that the Charter may be modified freely by a vote of the Security
Council or Assembly in individual cases. It is clear, on the other
hand, that it cannot remain fixed and unchanged forever. What
must take place is a gradual evolution. So far as functions of the
organization are concerned, such evolution should occur only along
lines which appear to be basically important and necessary to the
fulfillment of major United Nations purposes. The power to assume
responsibility for the government of a territory is evidently such a
80 Res. 377 MV, U.N.

GEN. Ass. OFF.

REc. 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 10 (A/1775)

(1950).
1

8 The Assembly decided that it should initiate the desired measures in the

Palestine and West Irian cases. It also decided that the immediate responsibility for
carrying out the measures should be delegated to, respectively, the United Nations
Palestine Commission (for the transfer of authority from the Palestine Mandatory
Authority to the projected new states), the Trusteeship Council (Jerusalem), the Economic and Social Council (Joint Economic Board) and the Secretary-General (West
Irian).
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function. The Council debate in the Trieste case could have been
an important first step in carrying out a Charter development in this
respect; however, this start can hardly be said to have been followed
through in subsequent cases, so that when the United Nations
finally assumed actual responsibility for a territory in the West Irian
case, the Charter basis upon which it did so must remain uncertain.
The question may suggest itself, at this point, whether such considerations of long-range Charter development are of any importance, or whether it is not enough if the organization merely seeks
to do justice in accordance with the wishes of the parties to a dispute,
or of a majority of the Assembly or Security Council. This is a vital
question with which this article, concerned only with a small category of cases, cannot deal fully. 82 The present discussion is, however, predicated on the view that it is necessary to build up the
Charter as the basis of a system capable of maintaining peace and
security. The cases under discussion are believed to afford illustrations of the proposition that the handling of actual disputes and situations may afford opportunities for advancing this goal, but that
these opportunities may not always be realized to the fullest extent.
The importance of the handling of individual cases in a manner consistent with the development of fundamental law is essentially twofold. First, in terms of the goal itself, the essence of any effectively
functioning constitutional system is that it must be seen as continuously endeavoring to achieve justice through the vindication of
its own principles in an impartial and dispassionate manner. Secondly, speaking in terms of means to the end, it is necessary to restate
the goal in terms of a necessity that the Charter should come to
have its own existence as an independent international entity,
with its own basis of support among the world's statesmen and
leaders of public opinion. It must, in other words, become a living
force instead of being merely a piece of paper. There is probably
no better way of making progress toward this objective than through
actual use of the organization in accordance with the Charter, making it clear, meanwhile, what are the applicable Charter principles
in any given situation. While it is evident that such a course cannot
be followed comprehensively under present world conditions, some
88 A recent, more broadly based study concludes, contrary to the view of this article,
that the legal powers of the United Nations and other international organizations
are not confined to such acts or rights as are specified in their constitutions. Seyersted,
United Nations Forces: Some Legal Problems. 37 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 351, 447-71 (1961).
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progress along these lines would seem possible. Conversely, it is
believed that the potential of the United Nations is set back to a
corresponding extent whenever there is a rejection of law or the
Charter, or any distortion or avoidance of applicable Charter principles.
However, actual situations are likely to be controlled by more
"practical" considerations than these. Where violence seems imminent, for example, some may feel that a sacrifice of Charter principles
is well worthwhile in the interests of achieving a peaceful solution.
It is also true that states normally will not hesitate to sacrifice the
interests of the United Nations in favor of what they consider to be
their own immediate self-interests. It is unrealistic to expect a
change in this attitude except through the slow process of building
up the prestige and moral force of the United Nations. It may be
constructive, however, to consider whether, in concrete cases, the
divergence between "practical" and "long-range" considerations is
always as great as might be thought.
Among the cases here under consideration, there was no dispute
as to the assumption of governmental powers by the United Nations
in either the Trieste or West Irian cases. Presumably a fuller elucidation of Charter issues would have been equally as possible in the
latter case as it was in the former, without jeopardizing the settlement.
It is therefore, only with respect to the Palestine case, among the
group under discussion, that the practical questions of conflicting
short and long range interests come into issue. In that case, the constitutional issues under discussion seem to have been subordinated
in an attempt to bring about a peaceful solution of the immediate
problem. It seems valid to assume, however, that there was never
a chance that the Arab states would have accepted the plan for the
partition of Palestine. From this point of view, therefore, the practical prospects would not have been affected if more attention had
been paid to the constitutional problems involved in the proposals
pertaining to the Palestine Commission, Jerusalem, and the Joint
Economic Board. However, regarding the precedential value of
these proposals as to other cases that might arise, and considering the
possibility that in some cases the parties might not be so intransigent
as were the Arab states in this case, it may be observed that the Arab
states which here raised the legal arguments and demanded that a
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constitutional approach be followed were also the ones which rejected the proposed solution. Assuming that a mutually agreeable
solution were within the realm of possibility, it is difficult to perceive
how the chances of settlement could have been worsened by carrying
out a full elucidation of the constitutional issues precipitated. It is
conceivable but not inevitable that some elements of the plan might
then have had to be abandoned as contrary to the Charter. In light
of this possibility, however, it should be observed that the Palestine
partition plan failed in its entirety for want of Arab agreement and
with it the various parts that involved constitutional questions. The
most important objective was clearly to gain acceptance by the Arab
states of the Assembly's basic recommendation for the partition of
Palestine. If this goal could have been advanced by giving, in response to the Arab wishes, full and conscientious consideration to the
constitutional questions involved, some sacrifice in the details of the
plan would have been justified from a purely practical point of view.
Substitute provisions of a satisfactory nature presumably could have
been worked out once agreement to the basic plan had been secured.
In conclusion, the opinion is ventured, based on the relatively few
cases here considered, that if a serious effort were made to do so, full
elucidation of constitutional issues could be effectuated to an extent
greater than past practice would indicate. It is submitted, furthermore, that the potential of the Charter as an instrument for the
maintenance of peace and security would be enhanced to the extent
that such an effort were made.

